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From the Strait of Hormuz to the South China Sea: ASEAN Faces a New Map of Energy Power

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15 min read

The Manila summit comes at an especially delicate moment for Southeast Asia. The crisis in the Strait of Hormuz has demonstrated just how severely an interruption to maritime traffic can disrupt global energy supplies. In this context, territorial disputes with China take on a strategic dimension that goes far beyond sovereignty over islands or reefs: the security of the routes through which a substantial share of the world's goods and energy resources are transported is at stake.

The global economy depends on a network of maritime routes whose stability is far more fragile than is generally acknowledged. Some of their main transit points, such as the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca, concentrate a volume of commercial and energy traffic that is difficult to replace. Between them lies one of the most important connections in international trade, linking hydrocarbon producers in the Persian Gulf with the major industrial economies of East Asia.

For decades, this geography has been regarded as a relatively stable feature of global trade. Ships moved freely, transport costs remained within manageable limits, and territorial disputes in the South China Sea were viewed primarily as a regional security issue. However, the Hormuz crisis has served as a reminder that the stability of maritime routes cannot be taken for granted. It depends on political, military and diplomatic balances that can change rapidly.

The 49th summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), inaugurated on 15 November in Manila, is taking place against precisely this backdrop. The eleven member states must address issues such as rising energy prices, food security, the conflict in Myanmar and one of the region's longest-running diplomatic negotiations: the establishment of a code of conduct between China and the countries involved in territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

The choice of the Philippines as host carries particular significance. Manila is involved in one of the most visible maritime confrontations with Beijing and holds the organisation's rotating chairmanship this year. Its president, Ferdinand Marcos Jr., faces the challenge of finding common ground among countries with very different strategic interests. At the same time, he must protect the Philippines from the economic consequences of an energy crisis that has exposed the country's heavy dependence on imports.

The contradiction is clear. The Philippines needs maritime stability and guarantees for its trade routes, yet its relationship with the power that exercises the greatest influence over those waters is marked by mistrust. Moreover, its regional partners do not always share the same willingness to adopt a firm position towards China.

The Manila summit therefore raises a question that goes beyond traditional sovereignty disputes: can Southeast Asia guarantee the security of its main trade corridors without a genuinely shared regional strategy?

Hormuz and Malacca: Two Straits, One Shared Energy Vulnerability

To understand the strategic dimension of this crisis, it is important to distinguish between the functions of the main maritime areas involved. The South China Sea does not replace the Strait of Hormuz as the main outlet for oil from the Persian Gulf. They are different maritime areas, but they are connected within the same international logistics chain.

Hormuz connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Indian Ocean. A substantial share of internationally traded oil passes through its waters. Numerous shipments destined for China, Japan, South Korea and other Asian markets subsequently continue their journey towards the Strait of Malacca and the waters of the South China Sea.

This connection explains why the Hormuz crisis has heightened concerns about maritime security in Asia. It does not mean that the South China Sea could automatically become an alternative route if transit through Hormuz were interrupted. Rather, it constitutes another vulnerable point within an interconnected commercial and energy infrastructure.

The distinction is important. If an oil tanker cannot leave the Persian Gulf because of an interruption in Hormuz, safe navigation in the South China Sea does not solve the problem. Similarly, if tensions in Asian waters disrupt commercial traffic, countries in the region may face further complications even when supplies have successfully passed through the Strait of Hormuz.

The real risk lies not only in the possible closure of a maritime passage, but in the accumulation of vulnerabilities along the same supply chain.

The Middle East crisis has made this issue a political priority for Asian governments. In May, ASEAN leaders acknowledged, through a joint declaration, the consequences of the conflict for energy markets and transport routes. They called for safe passage through Hormuz, defended the continuity of energy, food and essential goods supply chains, and proposed exploring regional mechanisms for joint oil storage.

Prolonged increases in fuel prices have consequences that extend far beyond the energy sector. They raise transport, fertiliser, industrial production and food distribution costs. They also put pressure on public budgets when governments attempt to contain prices and reduce household purchasing power when protective measures prove insufficient.

For economies that still need to grow, industrialise and support expanding urban populations, expensive energy can quickly become an economic and social problem.

The Philippines represents one of the clearest examples of this vulnerability. An analysis published by Chatham House in May indicated that the country imported 98% of its oil from the Gulf. The crisis has forced the Marcos administration to explore new avenues for energy cooperation, including with China.

This dependence explains the complexity of the Philippines' position. Manila needs to defend freedom of navigation and protect its maritime claims, but it must also avoid an escalation that could jeopardise its economic relations and energy security. The power with which it has its main territorial disagreements is, at the same time, an economic interlocutor it cannot easily do without.

The South China Sea: Much More Than a Territorial Dispute

For years, the disputes in the South China Sea have been explained through maps, archipelagos and sovereignty claims. The Spratly Islands, the Paracel Islands and Scarborough Shoal have become some of the main flashpoints in a dispute between China and several Southeast Asian countries.

However, reducing the conflict to a territorial issue means overlooking its true strategic dimension.

The South China Sea connects major industrial centres, commercial ports and energy corridors. Ships carrying oil, liquefied natural gas, electronic components, machinery and consumer goods destined for some of the world's most important economies pass through its waters. Any significant disruption would have consequences extending far beyond the borders of the countries directly involved.

China claims extensive rights over this maritime area based on historical arguments that conflict with the positions of several neighbouring states and with fundamental aspects of international maritime law. The Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei maintain overlapping claims. Indonesia, although not involved in the main territorial disputes over the islands, has also experienced tensions with Beijing over activities in waters linked to its exclusive economic zone.

One of the main legal precedents came in 2016, when an arbitral tribunal constituted under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea rejected the legal basis for China's broad claims to historic rights within the so-called nine-dash line. Beijing rejected the ruling and continues not to recognise it.

This disagreement is of considerable importance. For the Philippines, international law represents an essential tool for defending its interests against a power with far greater military and economic capabilities. For China, accepting certain interpretations of the arbitration would mean abandoning positions it considers closely tied to its national and strategic interests.

A confrontation is unfolding between these two positions, and it does not need to develop into an open war to have consequences. Coast guard movements, incidents between vessels, access restrictions and the continued presence of state-operated assets can alter the conditions under which certain maritime areas are used. These are mechanisms of pressure that allow influence to be exercised without necessarily crossing the threshold into armed conflict.

The danger lies precisely in this dynamic. A confrontation could begin with an incident between vessels, a manoeuvre interpreted as a threat or a disproportionate response. None of the parties needs to have decided to start a war for an apparently localised situation to trigger an international crisis.

In the case of the Philippines, there is also an additional factor: its defence alliance with the United States. A serious confrontation could activate security commitments and considerably broaden its geopolitical consequences.

The South China Sea is not merely an arena of rivalry between neighbouring countries. It is also one of the areas where strategic competition between Washington and Beijing could take on a direct military dimension.

Two Decades of Negotiations and a Code of Conduct Still Pending

One of the Philippines' main objectives during its ASEAN chairmanship was to move towards concluding a code of conduct for the South China Sea.

The proposal is based on a reasonable premise: if the countries involved cannot immediately resolve their territorial differences, they should at least establish common rules to reduce the risk of incidents, facilitate communication and allow potential crises to be managed.

The problem is that negotiations between China and ASEAN have been under way for more than two decades without reaching a definitive agreement.

Although progress has been made in drafting the document, fundamental questions remain unresolved. These include its geographical scope, the extent of certain obligations and, particularly, whether the code will be legally binding.

In the days leading up to the summit, various diplomatic reports placed provisional agreement at around 80% of the draft. The figure could give the impression that an agreement was close, but in diplomacy the outstanding points are not necessarily the least important. Sometimes, the issues generating the greatest disagreements are precisely those that determine the practical value of a commitment.

On 15 November, it was confirmed that China and ASEAN had failed to finalise the code during the Philippine chairmanship. The Philippines' foreign secretary, Maria Theresa Lazaro, acknowledged that differences remained over essential issues, including the document's binding nature. Negotiations will have to continue under Singapore's chairmanship in 2027.

The importance of this agreement does not lie in its ability to resolve every territorial dispute, something that is unrealistic in the short term. Its main value would be to establish communication channels, procedures to prevent incidents and crisis-management mechanisms that reduce the possibility of military escalation.

However, a document that merely recommends restraint, without clear obligations or verifiable mechanisms, could improve the diplomatic climate without providing sufficient guarantees in the event of a real confrontation.

The fundamental question is no longer whether China and ASEAN are capable of drafting a common text. It is whether they are willing to accept rules that remain effective when compliance conflicts with the strategic interests of one of the parties.

ASEAN and the Challenge of Speaking with One Voice

From a European perspective, there is a tendency to interpret ASEAN as an Asian version of the European Union. The comparison may be useful in understanding its institutional dimension, but it can also lead to misleading conclusions.

The organisation brings together eleven countries with very different political systems, levels of development and strategic priorities. Its functioning is largely based on consensus and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of its members. This model has made it possible to maintain areas of cooperation between governments with divergent interests, but it also makes it difficult to adopt firm positions when significant disagreements arise.

The Philippines needs regional support in response to the pressure it reports in its waters. Vietnam has its own claims and a complex relationship with China, shaped simultaneously by economic proximity and strategic competition. Malaysia and Brunei tend to adopt less confrontational diplomatic positions, while other members of the organisation give greater priority to their economic relations with Beijing or do not consider maritime disputes an immediate threat to their interests.

This does not mean that ASEAN is divided into two clearly defined blocs. Its members may agree on defending freedom of navigation while disagreeing on how to respond to a particular incident. They may also maintain significant trade relations with China while rejecting certain actions by its coast guard.

The Hormuz crisis has nevertheless introduced an element of shared concern. Even countries less directly involved in territorial disputes have reasons to defend the security of maritime routes and the continuity of energy supplies.

In June, the Philippine foreign secretary explicitly linked the experience of Hormuz to the need to make progress on the code of conduct. The argument is straightforward, but it has considerable strategic significance: a crisis at a maritime chokepoint can affect economies thousands of kilometres away. Preventing a similar situation in the South China Sea would benefit the entire region.

The comparison carries political weight, although it also has limitations. Hormuz is a strait with specific geographical characteristics and an energy-related function. The South China Sea is a much larger area, with different trade routes, numerous actors and complex sovereignty disputes.

The scenarios are not equivalent, but they share a fundamental principle: when international trade depends on maritime areas exposed to geopolitical tensions, the security of navigation ceases to be an exclusively regional issue.

China, the United States and the Contest for Maritime Influence

Talking about control of the South China Sea can convey an overly simplistic image of the conflict: the possibility that one country might decide to close a route and block international trade. However, influence over a maritime area can be exercised in much more complex ways.

Naval presence, infrastructure, surveillance, administrative pressure and the ability to respond to incidents make it possible to alter the conditions under which certain waters are used without formally announcing a blockade.

China has an obvious advantage in terms of military and industrial capabilities over any of its Southeast Asian neighbours considered individually. It also has enormous economic interests in the continuity of maritime trade. A prolonged disruption would harm its exports, energy imports and the stability of its supply chains.

For this reason, it would be a mistake to assume that Beijing necessarily seeks to paralyse commercial traffic. Its strategy may reflect a more complex objective: increasing its ability to influence security conditions in these waters, limiting certain activities by other states and strengthening its territorial claims without triggering a crisis that could seriously damage its own economy.

The United States, for its part, defends freedom of navigation and maintains a significant military presence in the Indo-Pacific. Washington has an interest in preventing China from achieving a dominant position that would allow it to condition access to strategic routes. However, this presence is also part of a rivalry between major powers that could increase the risk of incidents.

For ASEAN, the challenge is to avoid a situation that many of its members consider undesirable: maintaining a high degree of economic dependence on China while their security is shaped by the military confrontation between Beijing and Washington.

The objective of Southeast Asian governments is not necessarily to choose between the two powers, but to preserve a degree of autonomy that allows them to benefit from their economic relations without becoming subordinate to their strategic priorities.

Trump Arrives in Manila as China Watches the Regional Balance

The summit also incorporates a diplomatic dimension that extends beyond ASEAN member states. Donald Trump is scheduled to arrive in Manila on Tuesday, after the main meetings of regional leaders. China is represented by Premier Li Qiang, whose schedule does not coincide with the US president's visit.

There will therefore be no joint negotiation between the two leaders within the framework of this summit. Nevertheless, their political presence reflects the importance that both Washington and Beijing attach to Southeast Asia.

For the United States, the region is a fundamental component of its Indo-Pacific strategy. It concentrates trade routes, industrial capabilities, strategic mineral resources and supply chains essential to technological sectors in which Washington competes directly with China.

For Beijing, ASEAN represents a priority economic environment and an area where US influence could affect its security interests. Countries in the region are fully aware of this rivalry and seek to make the most of their relations with both powers without becoming trapped in a confrontation they cannot control.

The Philippines occupies a particularly delicate position. Its alliance with the United States strengthens its ability to respond to China, but it could also turn a maritime incident into a much broader security crisis. Marcos needs to maintain US support without allowing his country to become the starting point for a regional escalation.

The energy crisis adds a new dimension to this balance. Manila has explored possibilities for dialogue with Beijing on energy cooperation and potential joint resource-exploitation projects. Any initiative of this kind would require caution and would have to respect the legal obligations and sovereign positions of the parties involved.

Crises can force governments with deep disagreements to negotiate. However, turning those conversations into lasting agreements requires more than short-term interests.

Energy Security Cannot Be Guaranteed by Military Presence Alone

The Manila debate would be incomplete if it were limited to naval presence and territorial tensions with China. The Hormuz crisis has exposed a structural problem for Southeast Asia: dependence on imported energy supplies and maritime routes whose security is not entirely under the control of consumer countries.

Protecting navigation is essential, but it is also necessary to reduce vulnerability to future disruptions.

ASEAN has examined various energy cooperation proposals, including the creation of shared oil reserves and regional mechanisms for responding to supply emergencies in a coordinated manner. The logic is straightforward: if several countries have coordinated reserves, they can cushion part of the impact of a temporary disruption and prevent competition for available resources from making the crisis worse.

However, implementing these mechanisms presents significant difficulties. It would be necessary to determine who finances the reserves, where they are stored, under what conditions they can be released and how fuel is distributed when several countries need it simultaneously.

It would also be necessary to ensure that national decisions do not end up weakening regional cooperation precisely when circumstances require a joint response.

Furthermore, strategic reserves only provide protection for a limited period. They do not replace supplier diversification, the development of energy infrastructure, improved efficiency or the transition towards energy sources that are less exposed to fossil fuel imports.

Energy security has a military dimension, but also an industrial, financial and technological one. For Asian economies, the current crisis could accelerate investments that were already necessary. For their governments, it raises a fundamental budgetary question: how much should they invest in protecting existing routes, and how much should they invest in reducing their dependence on them?

Myanmar and the Limits of Regional Cooperation

The war in Myanmar also occupies a prominent place on Manila's agenda and represents one of the clearest reminders of ASEAN's institutional difficulties.

Since the 2021 military coup, the country has been experiencing a serious political and humanitarian crisis, marked by violence, population displacement and the fragmentation of territorial power. The five-point consensus promoted by the organisation has failed to halt the fighting or establish an effective political solution.

This situation raises an uncomfortable question for the organisation: if ASEAN struggles to achieve verifiable progress in a crisis that directly affects one of its members, what capacity will it have to guarantee compliance with a maritime security agreement involving a much stronger external power?

The two problems are different. Myanmar is an internal conflict with significant regional repercussions, while the South China Sea involves disputes between states, maritime rights and rivalries between major powers.

Nevertheless, both scenarios test the same institutional capacity: turning declarations of consensus into concrete commitments that deliver results.

ASEAN's credibility will depend to a considerable extent on its ability to demonstrate that regional cooperation can go beyond diplomatic statements.

The Real Outcome of Manila: What Needs to Happen After the Summit

Describing the summit as a failure because it did not manage to finalise the code of conduct would be a premature conclusion. Maritime security negotiations are complex, and a poorly designed agreement could create a false sense of stability without addressing the underlying problems.

However, simply celebrating the fact that the parties have kept dialogue open will not be enough either. The real outcome will have to be measured by the Philippine chairmanship's ability to narrow differences on essential issues, the realistic prospects for progress passed on to Singapore in 2027, and the willingness of member states to support concrete mechanisms for preventing incidents.

On energy matters, it will be necessary to establish whether proposals for shared reserves translate into financial and operational commitments. It will also be important to observe whether governments make progress in diversifying their supplies and reducing their exposure to future disruptions.

In relations with China, the most relevant indicator will not be limited to the wording of official statements. Attention will need to focus on developments on the ground: the frequency and severity of maritime incidents, the behaviour of coast guards, the freedom of action of coastal states and the ability to manage a confrontation before it spirals out of control.

Regional diplomacy needs to demonstrate that it can influence events, rather than merely react to them.

The New Map of Global Energy Vulnerability

The Manila summit is taking place at a time when international trade is beginning to view its main maritime routes from a different perspective. The Hormuz crisis has demonstrated that a localised geopolitical disruption can trigger economic consequences on a global scale.

The South China Sea concentrates a significant part of this vulnerability. Not because it has replaced Hormuz, but because it forms part of the same commercial and energy architecture connecting the Middle East with the major Asian economies.

A simultaneous crisis in both areas could produce effects far greater than the sum of two independent disruptions. It could hinder supplies, increase transport costs, raise maritime insurance premiums and force companies and governments to reorganise entire logistics chains.

There are no grounds for presenting this scenario as inevitable. Doing so would amount to alarmism. Nevertheless, the possibility of a disruption on this scale is sufficient reason to justify a serious preventive policy.

ASEAN faces a task that cannot be resolved through generic declarations of unity. It needs credible maritime rules, effective energy cooperation mechanisms and a greater ability to act in a coordinated manner without becoming subordinate to the rivalry between the United States and China.

The Philippines has sought to use its chairmanship to bring positions closer together and place energy security at the centre of the regional debate. However, it has failed to finalise the main agreement on its maritime agenda. Negotiations will continue, and the underlying strategic differences remain unchanged.

The security of trade routes does not depend exclusively on who has more ships, who possesses greater military capabilities or who claims more maritime territory. It also depends on states accepting limits on their behaviour and on the existence of mechanisms capable of managing incidents when those limits are put to the test.

Hormuz has served as a reminder of the cost of discovering a vulnerability only after it has turned into a crisis. The South China Sea still offers room to act before a similar situation reaches a much wider international dimension.

The question left by Manila is whether Southeast Asian governments will seize this opportunity to build a stronger regional security architecture or continue to trust that global trade will, by itself, find a way through its conflicts.

Because, in the new map of energy power, controlling resources is no longer enough. It is also crucial to guarantee the routes through which they flow and, above all, to prevent their security from depending exclusively on the balance between the major powers.


 
 
 

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