Trump, Putin and Xi Facing the Ghost of a New Yalta: Three Powers, Three Agendas and Europe Left Out of the Room
The presidents of the United States, Russia and China are preparing for an unprecedented meeting in Shenzhen, on the sidelines of the APEC summit. Moscow is seeking to regain diplomatic prominence and negotiate from a position of equality; Washington wants to open a new chapter in nuclear arms control; Beijing intends to preserve its strategic room for manoeuvre without assuming commitments it considers premature. The meeting has yet to take place, but it has already raised an uncomfortable question for Europe: who decides the continent’s security when its main representatives are not part of the conversation?
In February 1945, while the Second World War was still underway, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin met in Yalta, a city in Crimea, to discuss what Europe would look like after the defeat of Nazi Germany. The three leaders represented the powers that had borne much of the Allied military effort. They also knew that their armies, agreements and disagreements would determine the immediate future of millions of Europeans.
Eighty-one years later, the name of that conference is once again circulating through diplomatic circles.
Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping are scheduled to meet on 19 November in Shenzhen, during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit. The White House has announced the meeting, and the Kremlin has confirmed the preparations. However, as of 16 November, disagreements remain over its agenda and format. The meeting should not be treated as a diplomatic agreement that has already been finalised.
The comparison with Yalta is powerful because it suggests something that particularly concerns the countries that will not be represented: that the major powers could once again negotiate matters of security, territory and spheres of influence without involving those who would directly bear the consequences.
But the analogy can also be misleading. In 1945, Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin were military allies facing a common enemy. Today, Washington, Moscow and Beijing maintain very different relationships of cooperation and rivalry. The United States is competing with China for technological and economic leadership, Russia is waging a war against Ukraine, and Beijing is seeking to expand its influence without becoming trapped by the strategic obligations of its interlocutors.
There is no shared post-war project. There is not even, for now, a sufficiently defined common agenda.
That does not make the meeting irrelevant. Quite the opposite. The political significance of Shenzhen may begin long before the three presidents sign any document. Bringing them together at the same table already conveys a particular image of global power: that of three states capable of discussing issues affecting many others, including countries that have not been invited.
Putin: returning to the centre of diplomacy without abandoning his demands
For Vladimir Putin, the opportunity is clear. Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the country has faced Western sanctions, isolation from numerous international forums and a protracted war whose human and economic costs continue to mount. Moscow has maintained important relations with China, India and other countries, but its position vis-à-vis Europe and the United States has deteriorated profoundly.
A meeting with the American and Chinese presidents would allow the Kremlin to project a different image: that of a Russia that remains indispensable to discussions about the future of the international order.
This is no minor detail in a foreign policy that attaches such importance to recognition of its great-power status. Putin does not need to secure a substantial agreement to benefit from part of the meeting's symbolic value. The photograph could be used to reinforce among Russian public opinion the idea that Moscow continues to participate in global strategic decisions despite the sanctions and the war.
Russia remains a major nuclear power and retains significant military capabilities. However, its economic weight is considerably smaller than that of its two interlocutors. Great-power status depends on several dimensions and cannot be inferred solely from a country's presence at a summit.
The Kremlin also has a much more specific objective: Ukraine. Moscow wants any negotiations over the end of the war to take its territorial and security demands into account. Russia has sought to bring the war and the European security architecture into the preparatory discussions.
The expression “European security architecture” may sound abstract. In reality, it encompasses decisive issues: the relationship between Russia and NATO, security guarantees for Ukraine, the Western military presence in Eastern Europe, and the principles that should govern borders and alliances.
For Moscow, discussing these issues directly with Washington offers an obvious advantage. It allows European security to be treated as a negotiation between major powers, rather than as a process in which Ukraine and European countries play a central role.
That does not mean the United States has accepted this interpretation. American officials have indicated that Trump does not intend to turn the trilateral meeting into a forum for negotiating the war in Ukraine. China has also been reluctant to include it on the agenda.
Here lies the first contradiction of the meeting: Putin may regard Ukraine as its main purpose, while the other participants are attempting to limit or move precisely that issue to the sidelines.
It is important to distinguish between recognising Russia as a necessary interlocutor and accepting the legality of its military actions. Talking to Moscow does not necessarily mean supporting its territorial claims. The problem arises if negotiations end up treating the sovereignty of third countries as a variable that others can trade away.
Trump: the appeal of a major nuclear agreement
Donald Trump arrives in Shenzhen with a different priority. The White House has placed nuclear arms control among the issues it wants to discuss. The proposal has a strategic rationale: the United States, Russia and China possess nuclear capabilities that shape international security, although their arsenals differ significantly in size and composition.
The context is particularly delicate. The New START treaty, the last major bilateral agreement limiting strategic nuclear weapons between Washington and Moscow, expired in February 2026. Its disappearance has left the two largest nuclear powers without the legally binding limits established by that instrument.
For Trump, promoting a new agreement that includes China could be presented as a major diplomatic achievement. The idea is not unreasonable. The growth of China's nuclear arsenal raises questions about the future evolution of the nuclear balance. An arms-control system that indefinitely excludes Beijing would struggle to reflect the full strategic reality of the twenty-first century.
But bringing China into the process is not simply a matter of adding a third signature to a bilateral treaty. The American and Russian arsenals are much larger than China's. Available estimates put Washington and Moscow at several thousand nuclear warheads each, compared with a considerably smaller Chinese arsenal. These are estimates and are subject to uncertainty.
The difference matters because any negotiation needs to establish what is being limited and on what basis. If the three countries accepted the same numerical ceiling, China might interpret this as an attempt to freeze its arsenal in an inferior position. If different limits were established, Washington would have to explain why the agreement provided sufficient guarantees. Russia, for its part, would want to preserve its strategic position in relation to both countries.
Furthermore, nuclear arms control is not simply about counting warheads. Delivery systems, deployed missiles, stockpiles, inspection mechanisms, verification procedures and technologies that can alter each country's response capabilities are also important.
American officials themselves have lowered expectations. The Trump administration does not expect to reach a nuclear agreement during this initial conversation.
Trump may be seeking a negotiating process rather than an immediate treaty. He may also use the meeting to demonstrate his ability to engage with two leaders with whom Washington has profound disagreements. A statement of intent on strategic stability could be useful. A permanent dialogue mechanism would represent a concrete step forward. A verifiable arms-control agreement would have much greater significance.
Trump also wants to address the war with Iran and the crisis in the Middle East. The positions of China and Russia could be relevant to the diplomatic evolution of the conflict, although their interests do not necessarily coincide with those of the United States.
Xi Jinping: hosting the powers without accepting their conditions
Xi Jinping occupies an unusual position. China is the host and one of the three main protagonists of the meeting. Its economic, technological and diplomatic weight makes it impossible to discuss the international balance seriously without taking Beijing into account.
However, Xi does not appear to share Trump's and Putin's enthusiasm for the trilateral format. Chinese authorities have expressed reservations about three-way nuclear negotiations and about the possibility of Ukraine becoming a central issue at the meeting.
On nuclear matters, China believes that the United States and Russia, as countries with much larger arsenals, should first assume responsibility for reductions. Beijing does not want to accept a framework that places it under the same obligations as two countries whose capabilities remain far greater.
From the American perspective, this position is insufficient if China continues to expand its arsenal. Both positions reflect identifiable strategic interests. Neither removes the need to find mechanisms that reduce the risks of an arms race.
Xi also has reasons to prevent Shenzhen from becoming a negotiation on Ukraine without European participation. China maintains close relations with Russia, particularly in the energy and trade sectors, but it also needs to preserve its economic ties with Europe.
A meeting that appeared to endorse a division of spheres of influence could damage the image Beijing seeks to project as a defender of sovereignty and multilateralism.
The statement attributed to German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier indicates that Xi had emphasised the need for Europeans to participate in any discussion about a conflict that directly affects their continent. This does not mean that China will adopt the European position on Ukraine.
Taiwan is the clearest example of China's red lines. Beijing considers the island part of its territory and rejects any international interpretation that treats its future as a separate sovereignty issue. The United States maintains security relations with Taiwan and a policy that combines legal commitments with strategic ambiguity.
A conversation between Trump and Xi could influence security perceptions in the Taiwan Strait, even if it produces no explicit agreement. Xi's challenge will be to use the meeting to strengthen China's prominence without becoming associated with a format that could damage its relations with other partners.
Europe: absent from a conversation that affects its security
European concern cannot be explained solely as a matter of protocol. The war in Ukraine is taking place on the European continent. Its consequences affect the security of neighbouring states, military spending, population displacement, energy infrastructure and relations between Russia and NATO.
Any agreement on ending the conflict will have direct implications for European countries. That is why the possibility of Washington and Moscow discussing fundamental aspects of European security in a format that includes neither Ukraine nor representatives of the European Union is so troubling.
The historical comparison must be handled carefully. Europe is not today a defeated continent occupied by foreign armies, as much of its territory was in 1945. The European Union has institutions, economic capacity and regulatory influence. Several European states possess significant armed forces, and France maintains its own nuclear deterrent. The United Kingdom, although no longer an EU member, remains an essential actor in European security and is also a nuclear power.
The problem lies elsewhere: Europe remains considerably dependent on the United States for military capabilities, intelligence, logistics and strategic deterrence. This relationship constrains its autonomy in managing a large-scale security crisis.
Dependence does not mean that Washington can automatically impose any decision on European governments. States retain sovereign powers and can accept or reject commitments that affect them. However, it does reduce their negotiating room when the United States plays a decisive role in the security guarantees that could accompany an agreement.
It would not be legitimate for a negotiation between major powers to determine Ukraine's sovereignty without Kyiv's participation. Nor would it be viable to build a lasting European security architecture while ignoring the positions of the countries that would have to implement and sustain it.
European participation does not in itself guarantee a good agreement. Its absence, however, creates a problem of legitimacy and implementation that would be difficult to resolve.
Yalta is a historical warning, not an exact description
The 1945 conference has become associated in European memory with the division of the continent and the consolidation of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. But history was more complex than the image of three leaders dividing countries on a map.
The Yalta agreements included decisions on Germany, the future international organisation and territories liberated from Nazi occupation. The Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe and the subsequent evolution of relations between the Allies were decisive in shaping the Cold War. Not all the consequences that followed can be attributed to a single meeting.
The analogy with Shenzhen should therefore be used to identify a political risk, not to claim that history is repeating itself.
In 1945, a military alliance had just defeated an expansionist power. In 2026, the three protagonists have profound strategic disagreements. The United States and China are competing for technological and economic leadership; Russia is seeking to revise aspects of the European security order; China and Russia cooperate, but their interests are not identical.
Moscow frequently uses the language of a multipolar order in which major powers have greater scope to defend their regional interests. China advocates an international system in which its weight is recognised and Western institutions do not monopolise the power to define the rules. The United States is trying to preserve its global influence while reviewing certain commitments and cooperation mechanisms.
The three perspectives contain elements of competition with the existing order, but they do not amount to a shared project. Indeed, the disagreement over the Shenzhen agenda shows that even the subjects to be discussed are themselves matters of negotiation.
Ukraine, Taiwan and Iran: those absent are also part of the negotiations
Major summits are usually analysed through what their participants say. In this case, it is also worth paying attention to those who will not be sitting at the table.
Ukraine is the most obvious case. Any discussion of territory, security guarantees or conditions for ending the war directly affects its sovereignty. An agreement negotiated without Kyiv could face problems of legitimacy and implementation, as well as legal and political objections.
Taiwan will observe the meeting from a different perspective. There is no open military conflict equivalent to the one in Ukraine, but there is a sovereignty dispute and strategic competition between China and the United States. The signals Trump and Xi send about their bilateral relationship could influence regional security calculations.
Iran represents a third scenario. The war and the energy crisis in the Middle East have demonstrated that regional conflicts can have international economic consequences. Washington wants to address the situation with Beijing and Moscow, but both countries maintain their own relationships and interests in the region.
There is no reason to assume that the three governments will easily reach a common position. Moreover, agreements affecting third parties have clear limits if those parties do not accept their terms.
Conflicts are not interchangeable pieces. They have different histories, legal frameworks, local actors and military balances. The influence of the major powers is enormous, but it does not eliminate the decision-making capacity of the governments and societies affected.
The nuclear dimension: a real opportunity amid exaggerated expectations
Of all the issues that could be discussed in Shenzhen, nuclear arms control is probably one of those with the clearest international rationale.
The expiration of New START has weakened the framework of verifiable limits between the United States and Russia. At the same time, the growth of China's arsenal introduces a third dimension into the strategic balance.
Dialogue between the three powers could help reduce risks, improve communication and explore future commitments. But effective negotiations would have to overcome significant obstacles.
The first is the asymmetry between the arsenals. The United States and Russia possess much larger nuclear capabilities than China. Beijing believes this difference should be reflected in any discussion of limits. Washington argues that China's expansion makes its inclusion in the control system necessary.
The second is verification. Nuclear agreements depend on procedures that make it possible to check whether obligations are being fulfilled. Without inspection mechanisms, information exchange and transparency, trust between the parties would be insufficient.
The third is the relationship between nuclear weapons and other strategic systems. Missile defence, long-range conventional weapons and new technologies can alter deterrence calculations.
The fourth is the political situation. Arms-control negotiations require continuity and a degree of predictability. The war in Ukraine, technological competition and tensions in Asia make it difficult to create such an environment.
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to consider any outcome short of a treaty irrelevant. Establishing permanent communication channels, agreeing on risk-reduction measures or beginning technical discussions on nuclear transparency could represent limited but useful progress.
Is Europe being sidelined, or is it losing its ability to exert influence?
Europe's absence from Shenzhen can be interpreted as a symptom of a broader problem. For decades, much of the continent's security has been organised around the transatlantic relationship. The United States has provided fundamental military capabilities and strategic guarantees. Europe has developed enormous economic and regulatory capacity, but its defence policies have progressed unevenly.
This division of responsibilities has helped sustain a relatively stable security architecture over long periods. It has also created dependencies. When Washington changes its priorities, European governments discover that they do not always have sufficient instruments to compensate for that shift.
The war in Ukraine has accelerated the debate on strategic autonomy, military spending and the defence industry. But increasing budgets does not immediately produce operational capabilities. Purchasing equipment, training personnel, integrating systems and coordinating decisions between states takes years.
Furthermore, Europe does not always speak with one voice. EU governments share broad interests in continental security, but they maintain different priorities regarding Russia, China, relations with the United States and the distribution of military responsibilities.
It would be wrong to claim that Europe has no influence. The EU remains a major economic actor and an important trading partner for China. Its member states participate in international organisations, maintain diplomatic capabilities and can influence the implementation of agreements that require their cooperation.
But economic influence does not automatically translate into strategic power.
The relevant question is not whether Europe deserves to be present for historical or institutional reasons. It is what capacity it has to make an indispensable contribution to decisions affecting its security.
Strategic autonomy does not mean giving up allies. It means retaining the ability to make decisions when allies have different priorities.
What to watch on 19 November
The Shenzhen meeting could still change in format or scope. This uncertainty is part of the story. It would be unwise to anticipate a historic agreement when the parties themselves have not finalised all the details and Washington has lowered expectations of immediate nuclear results.
It will be important to establish whether the three presidents hold a substantive discussion or whether the meeting is limited to protocol statements. It will also be worth watching whether they announce a permanent dialogue mechanism on strategic stability and what commitments, if any, accompany that announcement.
Regarding Ukraine, it will be essential to distinguish between general references to the need for peace and any concrete proposal affecting its sovereignty or European security guarantees.
As for China, the key question will be whether Beijing agrees to begin technical discussions on nuclear arms control or maintains its opposition to a trilateral framework under the conditions proposed by Washington.
And in the Middle East, any statement will need to be assessed in terms of its actual capacity to change the behaviour of the parties involved. A joint communiqué can be politically significant without constituting an operational agreement.
There may be no new Yalta. The question for Europe will remain
The appeal of the comparison with 1945 lies in its simplicity. Three powerful leaders meet, and the rest of the world fears they will decide its future.
The reality of 2026 is less straightforward. Trump, Putin and Xi do not represent a victorious alliance, nor do they share a common vision for the international system. Each arrives with his own objectives and with limits that the others do not appear willing to accept easily.
Putin is seeking recognition and favourable conditions for Russia in the conflict in Ukraine. Trump wants to demonstrate his negotiating ability and open a discussion on nuclear weapons that includes China. Xi intends to strengthen Beijing's prominence without assuming strategic obligations he considers disproportionate.
These differences reduce the likelihood of a major agreement. But the risk for Europe does not depend exclusively on the existence of a secret pact or the announcement of a formal redistribution of spheres of influence.
It may emerge in a less spectacular way: the main interlocutors could begin discussing European security in formats that exclude Europeans, leaving their governments to devote their efforts afterwards to modifying proposals drawn up without them.
This would not be an exact repetition of Yalta. It would be a sign that Europe's ability to influence its own strategic environment needs to be strengthened.
The response cannot consist solely of denouncing its exclusion. Europe has economic resources, institutions, military capabilities and diplomatic relationships. The question is whether it can use them with sufficient coordination to make its participation essential in any negotiation affecting its security.
Shenzhen has not yet produced a new world order. It may not even produce a significant agreement.
Nevertheless, it has already placed a question at the centre of international debate: who has the right to decide the security of other countries, and what happens when major powers attempt to negotiate without them?
For Europe, the answer cannot depend solely on what Trump, Putin and Xi decide to discuss on Thursday. It must begin with the continent's own ability to defend its interests before others sit down to discuss them.











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